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Abstract
I count the number of combinatorial choice rules that satisfy certain properties: Kelso-
Crawford substitutability, and independence of irrelevant alternatives. The results are
important for two-sided matching theory, where agents are modeled by combinatorial
choice rules with these properties. The rules are a small, and asymtotically vanishing,
fraction of all choice rules. But they are still exponentially more than the preference
relations over individual agents—which has positive implications for the Gale-Shapley
algorithm of matching theory.
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1 Introduction
Consider hiring a team of workers, from a set A of available workers. The decision of
hiring worker x is not independent of the decision to hire worker y; the workers may be
complements or substitutes. Let C(A) ⊆ A be the workers hired. The function C is
called a (combinatorial) choice rule. I shall give results on the number of functions C
that satisfy various properties.
The main application I have in mind is the theory of matching markets (Roth and
Sotomayor, 1990). In many-to-one, and many-to-many, matching theory, some agents
are matched to a set of agents. These agents’ behavior is modeled as a choice rule.
The classical results on matching markets—among others, that the core is nonempty—
require structure on the choice rules: substitutability and independence of irrelevant al-
ternatives (IIA). Substitutability was introduced, and applied to matching markets, by
Kelso and Crawford (1982). IIA is a rationality assumption. Further, substitutability
and IIA is the only structure needed (this is clear from Blair (1988), who first proved
some of the classical results).
I calculate the number of choice rules that satisfy substitutability, and substitutability
and IIA. The main implications of the results are:
1. The choice rules that satisfy substitutability are a small, and asymptotically van-
ishing, fraction of all choice rules. Arguably, then, substitutability is a strong
assumption. In continuous models, one routinely disregards cases with Lebesgue-
measure zero; the same logic suggests that substitutability is a strong assumption.
The obvious caveat is: Even if they are scarce, the substitutable choice rules
may nevertheless often occur. For example, because they are induced by certain
behaviors—such as “responsive” preferences (Roth and Sotomayor, 1990, page 173).
∗I am very grateful to Ilya Segal, for posing this problem, and for discussions on the results.
2. The choice rules that satisfy substitutability and IIA are exponentially more than
the preference relations over individual workers. So the choice rules with the right
structure are small, ma non troppo.
This result has an important implication for the Gale-Shapley algorithm for find-
ing a matching in the core. Segal (2003) proves that the Gale-Shapley algorithm
requires approximately as much communication as communicating a preference
relation over individual workers. My results and Segal’s then imply that the al-
gorithm requires exponentially less communication than full revelation of agents’
choice rules. The implication helps explain why the Gale-Shapley algorithm is so
widely used in practice.
See Segal (2003) on what communication means, and why full revelation is the right
benchmark.
My results exploit a connection between choice rules and a well-studied, but unsolved,
problem in combinatorics: The problem of counting the monotone boolean functions,
called “Dedekind’s problem.” I show that Dedekind’s problem is equivalent to the prob-
lem of counting substitutable choice rules. And that Dedekind’s problem gives bounds
on the substitutable and IIA choice rules. Then, existing bounds and approximations to
Dedekind’s problem give bounds and approximations to the problem of counting choice
rules.
The numbers involved are surprising. Suppose 8 objects can be chosen; much fewer
than in actual matching markets. Already with 8 objects, the substitutable choice rules
are a small fraction of the number of choice rules. There are 1.8 × 10308, roughly a
centillion, different choice rules (more choice rules than protons in the universe). The
number of substitutable choice rules is of the order 1099.
It may be easier to think of bits: With 8 objects, it takes one kilobit (1028 bits) to
communicate one choice rule, while communicating a substitutable rule takes 329 bits.
Communicating a substitutable and IIA choice rule takes between 35 and 285 bits. And
communicating a preference relation over individual objects takes 23 bits. 1
Non-combinatorial choice rules. Consider non-combinatorial choice: the objects
of choice are mutually excluding, and so choosing x is independent of the decision to
choose y. There is an extensive theory of non-combinatorial choice rules in decision
theory and social choice (see, for example, Moulin (1991) or Austen-Smith and Banks
(1998)).
Now, C(A) may still have more than one element. The interpretation is that any of the
elements in C(A) could be chosen. The model is identical to the model in combinatorial
choice. But the structure has a very different interpretation.
My calculations for combinatorial choice rules have some obvious, but possibly inter-
esting, implications for non-combinatorial choice rules.
1I explain these calculations in Section 4.6.
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Substitutability is formally identical to the condition called (Sen’s) α (or Chernoff’s
condition) in the non-combinatorial model. Thus, the choice rules that satisfy α vanish
as a proportion of all choice rules.
I also show that the choice rules that satisfy α are exponentially more than the choice
rules that are rationalizable by a preference relation. And that there are more rules that
satisfy (Sen’s) β than there are rules that satisfy α. So there are also many more rules
that satisfy β than there are rationalizable rules.
Section 2 presents the results on combinatorial choice rules. The proof of the main
theorem is deferred to Section 4. Section 3 presents the results on non-combinatorial
choice rules.
2 Combinatorial Choice Rules
2.1 The Model
Let X be a finite set of cardinality n. Without loss, let X = {1, . . . n}. A choice rule is a
map C : 2X → 2X such C(A) ⊆ A for all A ⊆ X. Let C(n) be the set of all choice rules,
i.e.
C(n) = ΠA⊆X2A.
For each choice rule C there is an associated choice rule R, defined by R(A) =
A\C(A). If C(A) are the chosen elements of A, R(A) are the rejected elements.
A choice rule C satisfies substitutability if, for all A,B ⊆ X,
A ⊆ B implies C(B) ∩ A ⊆ C(A). (1)
Equivalently, C satisfies substitutability if A ⊆ B implies R(A) ⊆ R(B).
A choice rule C satisfies independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) if, for every
A,B,⊆ X, if C(B) ⊆ A ⊆ B then C(B) = C(A).
The theory of matching markets requires two hypotheses on choice: substitutability
and IIA (see Kelso and Crawford (1982), Blair (1988) and Roth and Sotomayor (1990)).
2.2 Results
The calculation of |C(n)| is very simple, and probably known (I could not find a reference
in print). I include it for use in the rest of the paper.
Theorem 1. |C(n)| = 2n2n−1
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Proof. From the definition of C(n),
|C(n)| = Πnk=12k(
n
k).
So,
log |C(n)| =
n∑
k=1
k
(
n
k
)
=
n−1∑
k′=0
n
(n− 1)!
(n− k′ − 1)!k′!
= n2n−1.
Thus |C(n)| = 2n2n−1 .
Let C1(n) be the set of choice rules that satisfy substitutability. Let C2(n) be the set
of choice rules that satisfy substitutability and IIA; C2(n) is the important class of rules
for the theory of matching markets. If agents’ choice rules are in C2(n), the classical
results on matching markets follow. And all choice rules in C2(n) are rationalizable by a
preference relation over subsets of X. 2
The theorem employs the following notation. Let S(K, k) denote the number of
partitions of {1, . . . K} into k sets. S(K, k) is called the Stirling number of the second
kind (see e.g. Comtet (1974)). All logarithms in the paper are base 2, unless denoted by
ln, in which case the base is e.
Theorem 2.
2n(
n−1
b(n−1)/2c) ≤ |C1(n)| ≤ 2(n+κ log(n))(
n
n/2),
2(
n−1
b(n−1)/2c) ≤ |C2(n)|,
|C2(n)| ≤
∑
0≤k≤K≤n
(
n
K
)(
K
k
)
2(1+κ log(n)/n)(
n
n/2)k!S
((
K
bK/2c
)
, k
)
,
and log |C1(n)| ∼ n
(
n−1
b(n−1)/2c
)
. κ is a constant.
The proof of Theorem 2 is in Section 4. Section 4.1, in particular, presents the main
insight behind the proof.
I bring out the implications of Theorem 2 in Corollaries 3 and 5. The implications
were discussed in the Introduction. The corollaries do not use the upper bound on |C2(n)|
from Theorem 2. I use the upper bound in my calculations (Section 4.6), but I do not
know if it gives an asymptotic improvement over the upper bound on |C1(n)|.
Corollary 3. |C1(n)|/|C(n)| is o(2−2n), and log |C1(n)|/ log |C(n)| is o (1).
2In fact, any C ∈ C2(n) is rationalizable by any linear extension of the order APB if A = C(A∪B)—
the order used by Blair (1988). I thank Chris Chambers for pointing this out.
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Proof. Using the upper bound on |C1| from Theorem 2, and Stirling’s formula applied to(
n
bn/2c
)
,
log
22
n |C1(n)|
|C(n)| ≤ (n + κ log(n))
(
n
bn/2c
)
+ 2n − n2n−1
∼
{(√
n + (κ/
√
n) log(n)
) √
2/pi + 1− n/2
}
2n.
The term in brackets goes to −∞, so 22
n
|C1(n)|
|C(n)|
→ 0, as n → ∞. Thus |C1(n)|/|C(n)|
is o(2−2
n
).
By a similar calculation,
log |C1(n)|
log |C(n)| ≤
(n + κ log n)
(
n
bn/2c
)
n2n−1
∼
(
1/
√
n +
κ log n
n3/2
)
23/2√
pi
.
So log |C1(n)|/ log |C(n)| is o (1).
A preference relation over X is a transitive binary relation  over X. Let P(n) be
the set of all preference relations over X. The following theorem is due to Gross (1962)
(Barthe´le´my (1980) rediscovered the theorem, and presents a different proof).
Theorem 4. P(n) ∼ n!
2(ln 2)n+1
Corollary 5. log |P(n)|/ log |C2(n)| is o(n22−n)
Proof. Using the lower bound on |C2(n)| from Theorem 2,
log |P(n)|
log |C2(n)| ≤
log |P(n)|(
n−1
b(n−1)/2c
) = h(n).
Using Theorem 4,
h(n) ∼ log n!− (n + 1) log(ln 2)− 1
2n(npi/2)−1/2
.
The result now follows from log n! ∼ n log n, so (√n log n!)/n2 → 0.
3 Non-combinatorial Choice Rules
3.1 The Model
The model is formally the same as in Section 2.1: given a set X of alternatives, a choice
rule is a function C : 2X → 2X with C(A) ⊆ A, for all A ⊆ X. But now the elements
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of X are mutually exclusive choices. Still, C(A) may not be a singleton because the
decision maker is happy choosing any of the elements of C(A). Until now, C(A) may
not be a singleton because the decision maker decides to choose, as a package, C(A) over
any other subset of A.
Non-combinatorial choice rules have been studied extensively in the literature on
individual and social choice (see e.g. Moulin (1991), or Austen-Smith and Banks (1998)).
My model differs in one aspect from the standard model of choice: I allow that C(A) =
∅. Some researchers allow C(A) = ∅ (Aizerman and Aleskerov, 1995). But the most
commonly used model rules out C(A) = ∅.
There are four advantages to allowing C(A) = ∅. First, since ∅ is always a feasible
choice, it allows one to model either indecision, or the presence of an outside option.
Second, it gives a symmetric treatment of a choice rule C, and its associated R. The
advantage of a symmetric treatment will be clear from Proposition 6. Third, while it
implies some minor changes in the results on non-combinatorial choice (See Appendix A),
it does not seem to violate the spirit of the results on non-combinatorial choice. The
non-empty-valued C remain a special case. Finally, of course, the model coincides with
combinatorial choice.
3.2 Results
When applied to non-combinatorial choice rules, Statement 1 is not called substitutabil-
ity. It is called Sen’s α (or Chernoff’s condition—for Chernoff (1954), who introduced
it). The difference is more subtle than may seem at first; it is not just a matter of ter-
minology: Statement 1 is not what α amounts to in the combinatorial interpretation of
C. In fact, α amounts to IIA.
Now, knowing that Sen’s α coincides with substitutability, one obtains the obvious
restatements of the results in Section 2.2 to the α property in non-combinatorial choice.
I do not include the restatements in the paper.
A choice rule C satisfies Sen’s β if, for all A,B ⊆ X, A ⊆ B and C(A) ∩ C(B) 6= ∅
imply that C(A) ⊆ C(B). The following proposition is trivial; R is the rejection choice
rule associated with C.
Proposition 6. If R satisfies substitutability, then C satisfies β.
Proposition 6 implies that there are more choice rules that satisfy β than choice rules
that satisfy α. So the results in Section 2.2 give also a lower bound on the choice rules
that satisfy β.
Let C be a choice rule. Say that a preference relation  over X ∪ {∅} rationalizes C
if, for all A ⊆ X, x ∈ C(A) if and only if x  ∅ and y  x, for all y ∈ A. Let C3(n) be
the set of rules that are rationalized by some preference relation.
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Theorem 7. |C3(n)| ∼ n!(ln 2)n+1 .
The proof of Theorem 7 is similar to Gross’s (1962) proof of Theorem 4. But Theo-
rem 4 is not immediately applicable to |C3(n)|; since ∅ is an option, C3(n) contains strictly
more elements than P(n)(n) (or P(n)(n + 1)).
Proof. Preference relations  and ′ over X ∪ {∅} give rise to the same C if and only if
1. {x ∈ X : x  ∅} = {x ∈ X : x ′ ∅}, and
2. they coincide on all pairs (x, y) ∈ X2 such that x  ∅ and y  ∅.
So there are as many C in C3(n) as classes of preference relations that differ in either
(1) or (2). These can be counted as follows: First choose k + 1 = 1 . . . n + 1, the rank of
∅ in the rationalizing . Second, choose the set of k elements of X that is ranked above
∅. Third, choose a preference relation over the elements that are ranked above ∅.
Let wk = |P(n)(k)| be the number of preference relations over {1, . . . k}. Then
|C3(n)| =
∑n
k=0
(
n
k
)
wk.
Gross (1962) shows that wk =
1
2
∑∞
i=0
(
k
i
)
2−i. So,
|C3(n)| = 1
2
∞∑
i=0
2−i
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
ik
=
1
2
∞∑
i=0
2−i(1 + i)n.
Now I estimate the series above by 1/2
∫ ∞
0
2−x(1+x)ndx, since the difference between∑∞
i=0 2
−i(1 + i)n and
∑∞
i=1 2
−i(1 + i)n is negligible when n is large.
1/2
∫ ∞
0
2−x(1 + x)ndx =
∫ ∞
0
2−yyndy −
∫ 1
0
2−yyndy
=
(
1
ln 2
)n ∫ ∞
0
zne−z
dz
ln 2
−
∫ 1
0
2−yyndy
=
n!
(ln 2)n+1
−
∫ 1
0
2−yyndy
The first equality follows from the change of variables y = x + 1, and from adding and
subtracting the integral from 0 to 1. The second equality follows from the change of
variable z = y ln 2. The third equality follows from recognizing the Gamma function,
and using Γ(n + 1) = n!. Since
∫ 1
0
2−yyndy → 0, |C3(n)| ∼ n!(ln 2)n+1 .
In light of Theorem 7, the following corollary follows just like Corollary 5.
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Corollary 8. log |C3(n)|/ log |C2(n)| is o(n22−n).
And, for α alone,
Corollary 9. |C3(n)|/|C1(n)| is o(2−2n)
Proof. By the proof of Theorem 7, |C3(n)| =
∑n
k=0
(
n
k
)
wk ≤ n
(
n
bn/2c
)
wn. So, using the
lower bound on C1(n) from Theorem 2,
|C1(n)|
22n |C3(n)| ≥
2n(
n−1
b(n−1)/2c)
22nn
(
n
bn/2c
)
wn
∼ h(n) = 2
n√
n−12
n−1
√
2/pi
22n
√
n2n
√
2/pi n!
2(ln 2)n+1
.
Where I have used Stirling’s formula to estimate the
(
n
bn/2c
)
terms, and Theorem 4 for
wn.
In turn, and using log to simplify the expression,
log h(n) =
n2n√
(n− 1)2pi − 2
n − (1/2) log n− n− log n! + (n + 1) log(ln 2) + Ω,
where Ω = 2− (1/2) log(2/pi)
Since log n! is o(n2), log h(n) →∞.
4 Proof of Theorem 2
4.1 Idea of the proof, and auxiliary definitions.
A collection a ⊆ 2X of subsets of X is an antichain if A,B ∈ a implies A * B; antichains
are also called Sperner families. A collection a ⊆ 2X of subsets of X is an (order) filter
if A ∈ a and A ⊆ B implies B ∈ a.
The number of antichains is equivalent to Dedekind’s problem: finding the number of
functions f : 2X → {0, 1} that are monotone. The equivalence between the number of
antichains and Dedekind’s problem is easy to show (see e.g. Engel (1997)); the argument
is similar to that of the proof of Lemma 10 below. Dedekind’s problem is an open
problem. But there are known bounds, and asymptotic formulas.
The proof of Theorem 2 proceeds by relating the choice rules in C1(n) and C2(n)
(C1(n) is easy, C2(n) takes much more work) to collections of antichains, and thus to
Dedekind’s problem. The literature on Dedekind’s problem then provides the bounds
and asymptotic formulas reported in Theorem 2.
If C is a substitutable rule, rejection is monotone: if x is rejected from A, then x is
rejected from B, for all B ⊇ A. Let Tx be the collection of sets from which x is rejected,
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so Tx is a filter, and Tx is characterized by its minimal elements. The minimal elements
of Tx form an antichain.
Let (Tx : x ∈ X) be a list of such filters. I shall work with (Tx : x ∈ X), instead of
C. Thus one characterizes the substitutable C as assignments of an antichain to each
element of X. The characterization allows me to use results on Dedekind’s problem.
4.2 Results on Filters
I now present a series of short lemmas on filters. The results give some necessary, and
some sufficient, conditions for a system of filters to correspond to a choice rule that
satisfies substitutability and IIA. But the results fall short of a characterization of the
substitutable and IIA choice rules.
A filter at x is a filter Tx such that x ∈ A, for all A ∈ Tx.
Lemma 10. We can identify each substitutable C with a collection of filters (Tx : x ∈ X),
such that Tx is a filter at x, for all x ∈ X. The isomorphism between C and (Tx) is:
Given C, let (Tx) be
Tx = {A ⊆ X : x ∈ A\C(A)} .
And given (Tx) let
C(A) = {x ∈ A : A /∈ Tx} .
Proof. Identify C with R, defined as R(A) = A\C(A). C is substitutable if and only if
R is monotone. First, the collection (Tx) defined as above is a collection of filters. To
see this, note that x is in all its elements by definition. Also, if A ∈ Tx and A ⊆ B, then
x ∈ R(A) ⊆ R(B) by monotonicity of R, and R(B) ⊆ B, so B ∈ Tx.
Second, for each filter (Tx : x ∈ X), define R by R(A) = {x ∈ X : A ∈ Tx}. Then
R(A) ⊆ A since (A ∈ Tx ⇒ x ∈ A). And R is monotone since Tx is a filter.
Now fix a collection of filters (Tx : x ∈ X).
Lemma 11. (Tx) satisfies IIA if and only if, for every A,B ⊆ X with A ⊆ B, and every
x ∈ A:
((∀z ∈ B\A)(B ∈ Tz)) ∧ (B ∈ Tx) ⇒ (A ∈ Tx)
Proof. Let A,B ⊆ X with A ⊆ B and C(B) ⊆ A. By substitutability, A\C(A) ⊆
B\C(B). Since A ⊆ B, A\C(A) ⊆ A\C(B).
Note that, since C(B) ⊆ B, the statement [(∀z ∈ B\A)(B ∈ Tz)] is equivalent to
C(B) ⊆ A.
(Sufficiency) C(B) ⊆ A and B ∈ Tx imply A ∈ Tx. Thus A\C(A) ⊇ A\C(B). So
A\C(A) = A\C(B). This shows that C(A) = C(B).
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(Necessity) [(∀z ∈ B\A)(B ∈ Tz)] is C(B) ⊆ A. So IIA implies A\C(A) = A\C(B).
Hence, for all x ∈ A, if B ∈ Tx then A ∈ Tx.
For each B ⊆ X, let ZB = {z ∈ B : B ∈ Tz}.
Lemma 12. (Tx) satisfies IIA if and only if, for every B ⊆ X, for every z ∈ ZB,
(B\ZB) ∪ {z} ∈ Tz
Proof. (Necessity) Let B ⊆ X. Let z ∈ ZB. Let A = (B\ZB) ∪ {z}. Then for every
x ∈ B\A, B ∈ Tx. Further B ∈ Tz so IIA, by Lemma 11, implies A ∈ Tz.
(Sufficiency) Let A ⊆ B ⊆ X be such that, for all x ∈ B\A, B ∈ Tx. Then
B\A ⊆ ZB. Let z ∈ A be such that B ∈ Tz. By hypothesis, (B\ZB) ∪ {z} ∈ Tz. But
B\A ⊆ ZB implies that (B\ZB) ∪ {z} ⊆ A. Then A ∈ Tz since Tz is a filter. Hence, by
Lemma 11, (Tx) satisfies IIA.
Given (Tx : x ∈ X), for each x, let Mx be the collection of minimal elements of Tx.
So,
Mx = {B ∈ Tx : (A ⊆ B) ∧ (A ∈ Tx) ⇒ A = B} .
Lemma 13. If (Tx) satisfies IIA, then, for every x ∈ X and every B ∈ Mx, {x} = ZB.
Proof. IIA implies (Lemma 12) that (B\ZB) ∪ {x} ∈ Tx. Then (B\ZB) ∪ {x} ⊆ B
implies that (B\ZB) ∪ {x} = B. So {x} = ZB.
Lemma 14. Let (Tx) satisfy IIA. For every x, y ∈ X, if x 6= y then Mx ∩My = ∅.
Proof. Immediate from Lemma 13.
Lemma 15. If (Tx) satisfies IIA, then, ∪{Mx : x ∈ X} is an antichain.
Proof. Let A ∈ Mx, B ∈ My with A 6= B. If x = y then A * B since Mx is the collection
of minimal sets in Tx. If x 6= y then A ⊆ B would imply that B ∈ Tx, as A ∈ Tx and Tx is
a filter. But then x ∈ ZB. Impossible, as IIA implies that ZB = {y} by Lemma 13.
Remark 16. By Lemmas 14 and 15, {Mx : x ∈ X} is a partition of some antichain.
Lemma 17. Let (Tx : x ∈ X) satisfy IIA. For all x ∈ X, one the following must be true:
• Mx = ∅
• Mx = {{x}}
• ∃A ∈ Mx such that (∀y ∈ A\ {x})(My = ∅).
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Proof. Let Mx 6= ∅, and Mx 6= {{x}}, so {x} /∈ Mx. We need to prove that ∃A ∈ Mx
such that ∀y ∈ A\ {x}, My = ∅.
Suppose, by way of contradiction, that for every A ∈ Mx, there is y ∈ A with y 6= x
such that Ty 6= ∅.
Pick A ∈ Mx, let y1 ∈ A and D1 ∈ My1 . Let B1 = A ∪ D1, so x, y1 ∈ ZB1 . By IIA
and Lemma 12 there is A′ ∈ Mx with A′ ⊆
(
B1\ZB1
) ∪ {x}. Note y1 /∈ A′. By our
assumption, there is y2 ∈ A′ with My1 6= ∅. Let D2 ∈ My2 . Note y1 6= y2.
Given a sequence of different elements y1, y2, . . . yk−1, k ≥ 2, and corresponding sets
D1, D2, . . . Dk−1 with Dl ∈ Myl , with 1 ≤ l ≤ k − 1. Let
Bk = A ∪
(∪k−1l=1 Dl) .
So x ∈ ZBk and yl ∈ ZBl , 1 ≤ l ≤ k − 1. By IIA and Lemma 12 there is A′ ∈ Mx
with A′ ⊆ (Bk\ZBk) ∪ {x}. By hypothesis, there is yk ∈ A′ with Tyk 6= ∅. so there is a
corresponding Dk ∈ Myk . Since yk ∈ A′, yk 6= yl, 1 ≤ l ≤ k − 1.
But X is a finite set, so this has to stop, and there must be a A ∈ Mx with Ty = ∅
for all y ∈ A.
Lemma 18. Let (Tx : x ∈ X) satisfy IIA. Then, for all x ∈ X,
∩{A : A ∈ Mx} ⊆ {x} ∪ {y ∈ X : Ty = ∅}
Proof. Let A ∈ Mx and y ∈ A with y 6= x. If Ty 6= ∅ there is D ∈ My. Note that
D * A because D ⊆ A would imply that y ∈ ZA, in contradiction with Lemma 13. Then
x, y ∈ ZA∪D. By IIA and Lemma 12
(
(A ∪D) \ZA∪D) ∪ {x} ∈ Tx.
So there is A′ ∈ Mx with
A′ ⊆ ((A ∪D) \ZA∪D) ∪ {x} .
Since y ∈ ZA∪D, there is A′ ∈ Mx with y /∈ A′. Hence
∩{A : A ∈ Mx} .
Remark 19. Lemmas 10-18 imply that each C ∈ C2(n) can be identified with an assign-
ment of a collection of subsets Mx ⊆ 2X of X to each x, and a partition (Y, Z,W ) of X
such that:
1. (∀x ∈ X)(∀A ∈ Mx)(x ∈ A)
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YZ
X
Mz = {z}
· x
A1
A2
Mx = {A1, A2}
My = ∅
· y
· z
Figure 1: A collection (Mx : x ∈ X).
2. (∀y ∈ Y )(My = ∅);
3. (∀z ∈ Z)(Mz = {{z}});
4. ∪{Mx : x ∈ W} is an antichain of subsets of Y ∪W ;
5. (∀x ∈ W )({x} /∈ Mx); so |A| ≥ 2, for all A ∈ Mx.
Figure 1 is a sketch of one such collection.
Now fix a partition (Y,W,Z) such that Y and W are nonempty. For each x ∈ W ,
let ax be some antichain over Y . Construct assignment (Mx : x ∈ X) by letting Mx =
{A ∪ {x} : A ∈ ax}, for all x in W . Let My = ∅ for all y ∈ Y and let Mz = {{z}} for all
z ∈ Z.
Clearly, (Mx : x ∈ X) defines a system of filters (Tx : x ∈ X), by B ∈ Tx if and only
if there is A ∈ Mx such that A ⊆ B. It turns out that
Lemma 20. (Tx : x ∈ X) satisfies IIA.
Proof. Let B ⊆ X. If x ∈ ZB then there is some A ∈ ax with A ∪ {x} ⊆ B. Since
A ⊆ Y , Ty = ∅ for all y ∈ A. Hence A ⊆ B\ZB. Then (B\ZB) ∪ {x} ∈ Tx.
So (Tx) satisfies IIA by Lemma 12.
4.3 Upper and lower bounds
LetA(k) be the collection of antichains of the set {1, 2 . . . k}. Let B(k,m) be the collection
of antichains a ∈ A(k + m) such that (∀A ∈ a)(|A| ≥ 2) and ∪a ⊇ {1, . . . k}.
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Let η(k,m) be the multinomial coefficient,
η(k,m) =
[
n!
m! k! (n−m− k)!
]
.
Lemma 21. |A(bn/2c)|n−bn/2c ≤ |C2(n)|, and
|A(n− 1)| ≤ |C2(n)| ≤
n∑
m=1
n−m∑
k=1
η(k,m)θ(k,m).
Where
θ(k,m) =
∑
a∈B(m,k)


∑
{
i1,...ik:
i1+...+ik=|a|
}
|a|!
i1! . . . ik!


.
Proof. First, I prove the lower bounds on |C2(n)| in Lemma 21. The bounds follow from
constructions like those in Lemma 20.
Fix the partition (Y,W,Z) = ({1, . . . bn/2c} , {bn/2c+ 1, . . . n} , ∅). For each x ∈ W ,
let ax ∈ A(bn/2c) be some antichain. The assignment Mx = {A ∪ {x} : A ∈ ax} defines
C(A) = {x ∈ X : (@A′ ∈ Mx)(A′ ⊆ A)} .
Lemma 20 implies that C is substitutable and IIA.
So there are at least as many IIA and substitutable C as maps A(bn/2c){bn/2c+1,...n}.
This gives the first lower bound in Lemma 21. Letting (Y,W,Z) = ({1, . . . n− 1} , {n} , ∅),
and reasoning as before, one proves the second lower.
Second, I shall prove the upper bound on C2(n) in Lemma 21 By Remark 19, there are
at most as many C in C2(n) as partitions (Y,W,Z) of X, and assignments of antichains
to the elements of W that satisfy the five statements in Remark 19.
Hence, fix integers m and k, smaller than n. There are
(
n
m
)
possible choices for Y of
cardinality m. For each such choice, there are
(
n−m
k
)
possible choices for W of cardinality
k. The product
(
n
m
)(
n−m
k
)
is η(k,m). Given Y and W , there are at most θ(k,m) ways
of assigning to the elements of W an antichain over Y ∪W that satisfies (4) and (5) in
Remark 19. This gives the upper bound on C2(n).
The upper bound comes from assigning each x ∈ A some antichain over X. The
cardinality of these assignments is |A(n)|n
Lemma 22. |C1(n)| = |A(n− 1)|n
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Proof. By Lemma 10, |C1(n)| equals the number of systems of filters (Tx : x ∈ X). For
each x, there are |A(n− 1)| ways of assigning an antichain Mx to x; each antichain Mx
is identified with a filter.
Let S(K, k) denote the number of partitions of {1, . . . K} into k sets. S(K, k) is called
the Stirling number of the second kind (see e.g. Comtet (1974)).
Lemma 23.
n∑
K=0
(
n
K
) k∑
k=0
(
K
k
)
|A(K)|k!S
((
K
bK/2c
)
, k
)
is an upper bound on |C2(n)|.
Proof. Choose a number K ∈ {0, . . . n}, and choose a subset (W ∪Y ) of X of cardinality
K. Choose a number k ∈ {0, . . . K}. Choose a subset W of (W ∪ Y )of cardinality k.
Choose an antichain a ∈ A(K) over W ∪ Y . An assignment of a to the elements
of W gives a partition of a. The number of such partitions is S(|a|, |W |), the Stirling
Number of the Second Kind. By Sperner’s Theorem (Engel (1997) ), |a| ≤ ( K
bK/2c
)
.
Hence, S(|a|, |W |) ≤ S
((
K
bK/2c
)
, k
)
.
Now, each partition can be assigned in k! many ways to the elements of W . And there
are |A(K)| antichains over W ∪ Y . So there are at most |A(K)|k!S
((
K
bK/2c
)
, k
)
many
assignments of antichain over W ∪ Y to the elements of W . The stated upper bound
follows.
4.4 Proof of Theorem 2
First, that 2(
n
bn/2c) ≤ |A(n)| is immediate, since any subset of the collection of subsets
of {1, . . . n} with bn/2c elements is an antichain (Engel, 1997). Then, 2( nbn/2c) ≤ |A(n)|
together with the lower bound on |C2(n)| in Lemma 21, provide the lower bound on
|C2(n)| in Theorem 2.
Second, Kleitman and Markowsky (1975) proved that
|A(n)| ≤ 2(1+κ log(n)/n)( nn/2),
for some constant κ. Lemma 22 then implies the upper bound on |C1(n)|, and Lemma 23
the upper bound on |C2(n)|, in Theorem 2.
Third, Kleitman (1969) proved that
log |A(n)| ∼
(
n
bn/2c
)
,
which, by Lemma 22, implies log |C1(n)| ∼ n
(
n−1
b(n−1)/2c
)
.
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4.5 Note:
One can use other bounds from the literature on Dedekind’s problem, and obtain vari-
ations on the results that I present—see Engel (1997) for references to advances on
Dedekind’s problem.
The best asymptotic estimate for |A(n)| is due to Korshunov (1981). Clearly, Kor-
shunov’s estimate applies to estimating |C1(n)| (by Lemma 22).
4.6 Explanation of the calculations in the Introduction
The calculation of |C1(n)| is from Lemma 22 and the result that |A(7)| = 2414682040998
from Comtet (1974). The calculation for |C2(n)| follows from the bounds in Theorem 2,
but using the known values of |A(k)|. The values |A(k)|, for k = 1 . . . 7, are from Comtet,
while |A(8)| is from Wiedemann (1991). Gross (1962) calculates that there are 7087261
preference relations over a set with 9 elements (8 elements and ∅).
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Appendix A Rationalizability
Substitutability and β do not imply that C is rationalizable. In fact, substitutability and
β do not imply that C satisfies IIA. For example: Let X = {1, 2}. Let C(X) = ∅ and
C ({i}) = {i}, for i = 1, 2. Then C violates IIA, since C(X) ⊆ {1} but C ({1}) 6= C(X).
It is easy to verify that C satisfies substitutability and β.
Theorem 24 clears this issue. And it shows another use for the lemmas developed in
Section 4.2.
Theorem 24. C satisfies substitutability, β and IIA if and only if C is rationalizable.
Proof. It is immediate that a rationalizable C satisfies substitutability, β, and IIA.
Let C satisfy substitutability, β, and IIA. Let (Mx : x ∈ X) be the system of an-
tichains associated to C. Let  be the binary relation defined on X ∪ {∅} by:
• y  x if x 6= y and {x, y} ∈ Mx.
• ∅  x if {x} ∈ Mx; x  ∅ otherwise.
I shall prove that  is transitive. Then I show that  rationalizes C.
First, I need to prove the following statement:
(∀A ⊆ X)(∀B ⊆ X) [(A ⊆ B) ⇒ (C(A) ⊆ C(B)) ∨ (A ⊆ R(B))]
Let A ⊆ B, and A * R(B). By substitutability, R(A) ⊆ R(B); so A * R(B) implies
C(A) ∩ C(B) 6= ∅. Now β implies C(A) ⊆ C(B).
Second, I shall prove that, ∀x ∈ X, ∀A ∈ Mx, |A| ≤ 2. Suppose not. Let x ∈ X and
A ∈ Mx with |A| > 2. Then there is a set A′ with {x} ( A′ ( A. Since A is a minimal
set from which x is rejected, x ∈ C(A′). Now, IIA and x /∈ C(A), imply C(A) * C(A′).
Then, using the statement we proved first, A′ ⊆ R(A). Let y ∈ A′\ {x}; so A ∈ Ty. But
then y ∈ ZA (using the notation introduced before Lemma 12). On the other hand, by
Lemma 13, {x} = ZA, for all A ∈ Mx. A contradiction.
Third, I prove that y  x and z  y implies z  x. Let A = {x, y, z}. y  x is
{x, y} ∈ Mx, so A ∈ Tx; similarly, A ∈ Ty. So {x, y} ⊆ ZA.
Now, A\ZA = ∅ would imply that {x} ∈ Tx, as Lemma 12 says that {x}∪A\ZA ∈ Tx.
But that would contradict that {x, y} ∈ Mx.
We must have A\ZA 6= ∅; so A\ZA = {z}. By Lemma 12, {x, z} = {x}∪A\ZA ∈ Tx.
We know {x} /∈ Mx, as {x, y} ∈ Mx. So {x, z} is minimal in Tx. Hence {x, z} ∈ Mx.
Hence z  x, and  is transitive.
Finally I prove that  rationalizes C. Fix A ⊆ X. Let x ∈ C(A). Then {x} /∈ Mx,
as A /∈ Tx. So x  ∅. Let y ∈ A. Then again A /∈ Tx implies {y, x} /∈ Mx. So y  x.
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